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Using Nonprofits to Serve Charitable
Goals of Social Businesses in the United
States: Circumventing the Lack of
Recognition of the Social Business Model
in the Federal Tax Code
Gautam Jagannath*
I.

Introduction

Is the pursuit of profit always contrary to the public good?1 Social
businesses are for-profit businesses focused on pursuing their charitable
goal rather than maximizing profits.2 Often, they cater solely to their
social mission. These social enterprises opt to maximize their social
benefit while nevertheless producing a profit.3 One area in which social
businesses have garnered attention is microfinance. In 2005, the New
York Times reported that there were less than three hundred Americanbased microfinance companies offering microloans.4 Today, the ubiquity
of microfinance is evidenced by the measure of social concern for the socalled “indigent third-world.”5 However, the burgeoning excitement
* J.D. Candidate, Northeastern University School of Law (2012). The Author would
like to thank his mother for starting Amba, a social business, his partner Emily Abraham
for her tireless editing and concern for this Article, and Professor Beth Elliott for her
feedback.
1. Darryll K. Jones, Restating the Private Benefit Doctrine for A Brave New World,
1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2003).
2. See Muhammad Yunus, Founder, Grameen Bank, 2006 Nobel Peace Prize
Lecture (Dec. 10, 2006), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laure
ates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html#.
3. What Is Social Enterprise?, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://sealliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). This form of business
is quite old—predating capitalism—and has origins in the natural economy vis-à-vis
bartering.
4. Amy Zipkin, For Some, a Little Loan Goes a Long Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2005, at C5.
5. See Kentaro Toyama, Lies, Hype and Profit: The Truth About Microfinance,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/
01/lies-hype-and-profit-the-truth-about-microfinance/70405/.

239

1

JAGANNATH_Formatted_Finalv2

240

PACE LAW REVIEW

4/11/2012 7:39 PM

[Vol. 32:1

about microfinance raised an issue in American law: is the industry
charitable and should it be considered tax-exempt?6 In considering the
value of these organizations, it should be noted that, while microlending
organizations represent a form of social business, they are certainly not
the final solution to poverty.7 As states only recently begin to recognize
social enterprise, the United States federal government is still stuck with
traditional notions of charitable entities.8
Social enterprise is older than microfinance and is ubiquitous albeit
unrecognized.9 Literally hundreds of companies are operated as social
businesses in America.10 Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus of the
Grameen Bank contributed to, but did not “create,” the social enterprise
business model.11 Examples from recent times are varied and diverse,
including diners, rural clinics, start-ups, and public corporations.12 There
is a strong potential for these companies to do good, and even perhaps
change the face of capitalism.13 While this may be the case, the legal
separation between nonprofits and for-profits continues to enforce the
stale notion that they cannot be interrelated.14 Legislators have fixed
notions about what a nonprofit should do, and do not see for-profit
values as being an essential part of a nonprofit business model. As a
6. Kiva, for example, is an American based microfinance corporation that is wholly
based upon individual contributions and does not itself earn any interest. See About Us,
KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
7. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217
(2005).
8. Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies that Profit, but Can Tap
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at B1.
9. Julia Taylor Kennedy, A Conversation with Microfinance Pioneer Susan Davis,
POL’Y INNOVATIONS (Jul. 5, 2011), http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/audio/data/00
0615.
10. John Tozzi, America’s Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs 2011, BUS. WK.
(Jun. 22, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jun2011/sb201
10621_158462.htm.
11. This is not to diminish the fact that Yunus is a key actor in modern
microfinance. See Yunus, supra note 2.
12. See DENNIS R. YOUNG, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN THE UNITED STATES: ALTERNATE
IDENTITIES
AND
FORMS
(2001),
available
at
http://www.communitywealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/social/paper-young.pdf. Apparently, even Ben &
Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. was at one time a social business. Id. at 5.
13. Muhammad Yunus et al., Building Social Business Models: Lessons from the
Grameen Experience 22 (HEC Paris, Working Paper No. 913, 2009).
14. See e.g., P.L.L. Scholarship Fund v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 196, 200 (1984); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201115026 (Jan. 19, 2011).
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result, social businesses live on the fringe of American corporate law.15
Social businesses are organized as traditional for-profit
organizations, such as corporations. This is the reality because
limitations would befall them if they were organized as tax-exempt
organizations.16 One such problem recognized by social business owners
is that exempt organizations are limited by their operating budgets. 17
Unlike social businesses, nonprofits tend to be dependent on charitable
donations for a large percentage of their work.18 The social business is
not constrained in this manner through the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
because it is legally indistinguishable from any other for-profit.19 While
this provides great freedom for the social business, it is also unfortunate
because social businesses are not conferred any tax benefits or incentives
for the public service they perform.20 While the concept of the social
business is quite novel in American law, its potential is so high that it
should be rapidly embraced by the business sector. The problem lies only
in the implementation.
If social businesses were tax exempt, they would nevertheless be
taxed under federal tax law. This is because of the Unrelated Business
Income Tax (UBIT) rules, as well as the Excess Benefit Tax (EBT),
which seek to keep enterprises in line with their charitable goals.21 Social
businesses are not bound by the non-distribution rule, can expand
operations, and their executives are able to reap the financial rewards of
productivity.22 This level of discretion would be unacceptable for federal
tax-exempts. Accordingly, social businesses are wary about taking on the
risk of becoming an exempt, which includes liability. Such businesses do
not desire heightened governmental scrutiny arising from seeking exempt

15. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF
CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 117 (2010).
16. See Marci Alboher, A Social Solution, Without Going the Nonprofit Route, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at B5. See also James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010) (discussing the
implications of offering nonprofit benefits to socially active for-profit organizations).
17. Shelly Banjo, Report Faults Nonprofits on Service, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2010,
at A28.
18. Yunus, supra note 2.
19. Social businesses are organized just like any other for-profit, generally in a
corporate form.
20. See generally FAQs, YUNUS & YOUTH TUBE, http://yytube.net/index.php?option
=com_jefaq&view=faq&Itemid=57 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
21. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 1190.
22. YUNUS & YOUTH TUBE, supra note 20.
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status.
As a result, nonprofit exempt organizations are not a suitable
business vehicle to pursue the desires of social enterprise.23 Social
businesses generally require tremendous capital, have large cash flows,
and perform a wide variety of services, including the sale of goods and
offering of services unrelated to their charitable goals.24 Naturally, these
activities fall squarely within the goals of traditional corporations.25
These activities, while ultimately leading to charitable purposes, do not
necessarily do so within the meaning of the IRC’s exclusive charitable
activity requirement.26 One way to characterize many social businesses is
that they are companies that would have qualified as tax-exempt
organizations under the old income destination test that was eliminated
over a half century ago.27 Since that time, although social businesses
persist, Congress has not developed a way to recognize and reward forprofit social enterprise in the tax code. Entrepreneurs have devised
alternative, self-regulating business models to accomplish the beneficial
aspects of obtaining tax-exempt status.28 They have also sought non-tax
benefits of social entrepreneurship, which include a competitive
advantage.29 However, if social business truly act charitably then they
should be conferred some tax advantages as well.
This Article considers the possibility of reincorporating a social
23. YUNUS, supra note 15, at 120.
24. Yunus’ Grameen Bank is an example, having approximately 1.7 billion dollars
in revenue in 2010 (stemming largely from private sources, especially in its early days).
See Balance Sheet of Grameen Bank (1983-2010) in USD, GRAMEEN BANK,
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=179&Item
id=424 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
25. As one social business manager has noted, the social business can sometimes
perform profit-maximizing activities easier because actors are invested in the social
cause. See Rodney Schwartz, Is There an Alternative to the Big Society?, TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 17, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8331664/Is-there-analternative-to-the-Big-Society.html.
26. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2011).
27. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947,
957 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
28. B-corporations are examples of such businesses. See CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). Also notable are L3Cs (lowprofit limited liability companies), which are rapidly increasing in popularity. See AMS.
FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/ (last visited
Nov. 23, 2011).
29. Enterprises See a Competitive Advantage in Social Responsibility, INTERAMERICAN DEV. BANK (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/200912-02/enterprises-see-a-competitive-advantage-in-social-responsibility,6023.html.
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business as a tax-exempt nonprofit. An analysis of the costs and benefits
is performed with an eye toward federal tax law. First, I discuss the
potential problems with running a social business as an exempt
nonprofit. There are federal regulations that get in the way of making this
a savvy decision. Second, I posit that a social business can benefit from
devising a parallel exempt organization with similar or identical
charitable goals. There are a few ways to do this and I consider the pros
and cons. Finally, I consider the practical hurdles that social businesses
face by maintaining and operating tax-exempt organizations within the
context of how social businesses have positive consequences for global
development.

II. The Framework
In order to follow through with the analysis, this Article envisions a
hypothetical social business that (1) purchases relatively low-cost goods
(“goods”) produced by low-income producers (“producers”) substantially
above the prevailing market rate; (2) sells these goods in a new,
comparatively affluent market for a substantial profit; and (3) returns a
vast majority of these profits back to indigent suppliers by providing a
growing, consistent revenue stream of purchases (“reinvestment”). In
other words, the charitable purpose of the social business is to loyally
provide a monopsony for goods at a higher return for the producers.
Essentially, this reinvestment spurs development and leads to economic
growth for the producers.
Depending on how such a framework is implemented, the sale of
goods might not necessarily deviate substantially from the charitable
purpose of the organization.30 This means that some social businesses
could qualify for a tax exemption without incurring UBIT. However, this
would be unlikely and the problem looms for many social businesses that
engage in unrelated trade or business or simply raise capital.31
Substantial deviations from the exempt purpose would create a major
problem if the social business was an exempt.32

30. See § 513. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (1983).
31. See Hadley Rose, Comment, The Social Business: The Viability of a New
Business Entity Type, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 131, 142 n.74 (2007).
32. Indeed, it would threaten the exempt status of the organization. See discussion
supra Part I.
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III. Can a Social Business Be a Federal Tax-Exempt Nonprofit?
I only consider nonprofits to be those that have qualified, sought,
and obtained exempt status under IRC 501(c)(3) as public charities.
Although exemption from taxes is a major, if not sole, factor in seeking
exempt status, not all nonprofits qualify for or obtain the special tax
exemption.33 Those that do not obtain exemption unfortunately cannot
benefit from the crux of this Article.
In order to become tax-exempt IRC 501(c)(3) public charities, there
are several requirements social businesses must meet.34 Paperwork and
patience form the bulk of it. While state law is what governs nonprofit
status, a separate application governs the exemption conferred by the
federal government. An exempt can pool and spend money more
efficiently toward its charitable goal.35 Controversially, the exemption
has been thought of as a subsidy to companies that are doing “good” for
American society.36 While a wonderful concept, little legislative history
exists to back this claim.37 Tax exemptions have also consistently been
thought of as a privilege or boon given by the federal government.38
There are also state tax benefits that arise from being organized as a
nonprofit under state law.39 This often includes exemption from sales tax,
which can boost revenue.40
This Article will compare social businesses with what they could
become—501(c)(3) public charities. If this were possible or beneficial
33. There is no special requirement that compels a nonprofit to obtain federal taxexempt status. Presumably many nonprofits, which are stripped of (or never qualified for)
exempt status, continue to operate under state nonprofit law. See A Short Guide to
Vermont’s Nonprofit Corporations Law, VT. SECRETARY OF ST., http://www.sec.state.vt.u
s/tutor/dobiz/noprof/noprofex.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
34. § 501(c)(3).
35. ANTHONY MANCUSO, HOW TO FORM A NONPROFIT CORPORATION IN CALIFORNIA
6 (Diana Fitzpatrick ed., 13th ed. 2009).
36. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1976).
37. Id. at 303.
38. Id. at 342.
39. See, e.g., Non-Profit/Exempt Organization, CAL. TAX SERVICE CENT.,
http://www.taxes.ca.gov/exemptbus.shtml/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). See also
Corporate Income Tax: Exemptions, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (Thomson
Reuters/West 2011), 0140 SURVEYS 5 (West) (listing the applicable law in each state).
40. See generally Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Exemption of Charitable or
Educational Organization from Sales or Use Tax, 69 A.L.R.5th 477 (1999).
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under the restrictions imposed largely by United States tax law, then an
entire fleet of benefits, not merely financial in scope, would likely
follow.41 However, the ultimate question is whether it is economically
rational to convert a for-profit into a nonprofit for social businesses
similar to the hypothetical discussed above. If not, then the alternatives
should be seriously considered.

1.

Reorganization

A social business must first convert itself legally into a tax-exempt
organization. Curiously, little has been written about converting a forprofit business into a tax-exempt organization. The Model Nonprofit
Corporations Act discusses how a nonprofit may convert into a for-profit
under state law, but does not provide information regarding the
converse.42 The Model Business Corporation Act is also silent on this
matter.43 This may be because this conversion process rarely occurs or
perhaps because the process may seem straightforward.
The rarity of this conversion process may be because for-profits
would rather donate a percentage of their profits to charities than deal
with the paperwork of becoming tax-exempt. Assuming a for-profit is
willing to become tax-exempt, donations possess the tax benefit of
amounting to corporate tax deductions, over and above ordinary
operating expenses.44 These charitable donations can be written off
during the tax year in which the donations occurred.45 It is simply not
important for companies whose primary output is human capital to seek
exemption. Furthermore, exempt status cannot circumvent federal
income tax for employees.
In order for a for-profit to convert itself to an exempt, it would need
board approval to incorporate as a separate nonprofit under state law.46
This traditionally involves filings with the state’s secretary of state, to

41. The benefits of becoming a nonprofit begin with income tax exemptions;
however, there are several other ancillary benefits, including, for example, improved
public image from simply declaring 501(c)(3) status. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (West 2011).
42. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 9.30-9.34 (2008).
43. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12 (2007) (governing the disposition of assets)
(amended 2008).
44. I.R.C. § 170 (West 2011).
45. Id.
46. 8 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 3993.50 (West 2012).
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form and legitimize the corporation.47 Essentially two companies would
exist on the books at the same time for a short duration before the forprofit is dissolved pursuant to its articles of incorporation.48 Both
shareholders and the board of directors must agree that conversion is in
the best interest of the corporation.49 Once the newly formed nonprofit is
given approval by the IRS for exempt status (in this case as a public
charity), it then becomes a requirement for the for-profit to donate (or
sell) the assets in its entirety to the newly formed exempt organization.
While the process might sound deceptively simple, it would require
more than merely the will of the for-profits’ owners. The entire process
may be everything but hassle free if the social business has significant
assets, debts, and liabilities. The self-interest of directors and
shareholders can effectively prevent the conversion of a corporation, and,
at the very least, it seems that interested shareholders may be able to
prevent the conversion.50 If shareholders assert rights to the fair market
value of their shares, then the corporation may effectively become
bankrupt, leaving nothing to capitalize the new exempt.51 This extreme
circumstance is indicative of how difficult it is to alter corporate status
quo.

2.

Fulfilling the Organizational but Failing the Operational
Test

In order to form and survive, exempts must satisfy both an
organizational as well as an operational test.52 The organizational test is
generally a nonissue and determined by the paperwork filed, as well as

47. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, STARTING AND MANAGING A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: A
LEGAL GUIDE 133 (5th ed. 2009).
48. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 916 (2011).
49. One can imagine how difficult it might be if the corporation is even modestly
lucrative. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.01 (2008). Presumably, shareholders would
put up a fight to dissolve the corporation because conversion would not be in line with
the desire to maximize profit.
50. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2011) (indicating that shareholders have a say
in corporate dissolution).
51. Colin T. Moran, Why Revlon Applies to Nonprofit Corporations, 53 BUS. LAW.
373, 382 (1998).
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008). Further, as an example
of how these tests have traditionally been employed, see Columbia Park & Recreation
Ass’n v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1, 13 (1987).
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the articles of incorporation.53 The operational test is fact-intensive and
poses a larger problem. The fact-intensive inquiry is based upon the
actual business dealings of an exempt, as opposed to merely looking at
the intent of the creators in the filing documents.54 Satisfying the
operational test for the IRS is crucial to maintaining exempt status, but
also is a substantial loophole for social businesses. Case law has made it
extremely difficult to understand what factors go into the test, however it
is clear that no factor is dispositive and new factors can be considered as
needed.55
A for-profit social business will not satisfy the operational test
because its goals are inherently not exclusively charitable. Social
businesses serve profit motives in addition to charitable outcomes. Any
single non-exempt purpose will eliminate the possibility that a social
business can be a tax-exempt.56 It is easy to see that a social business will
fail the operational test due to the facts and circumstances that make it
profitable for owners while simultaneously contributing to a charitable
cause.57
If we assume that the social business is purchasing goods at abovemarket rate, this additional revenue to the producer should ideally be
considered a donation. The current tax law does not permit such a
transaction to be considered a charitable donation, but rather deems it a
purchase and sale.58 Under tax regulations, the only deductible portion of
charitable contributions is that which is above and beyond the prevailing
market rate of the good or service purchased.59 Therefore, a social
business is unable to deduct the full value of its inventory cost because it
likely spent fair market value on the goods as a market buyer.
In the hypothetical presented above, the social business’ purchase of
goods at above-market rate is considered to be merely an expense to the
53. See Nat'l Found., Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 486, 491 (1987); Treas. Reg. §
1.501 (c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008).
54. See B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Jessica Peña &
Alexander L.T. Reid, Note, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for Unrelated
Commercial Activities in Charities, 76 N.Y.U L. REV. 1855, 1868 (2001).
55. See, e.g., Nonprofits’ Ins. Alliance of California v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl.
277, 284 (1994).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(4) (as amended in 2008) (indicating that one
nonexempt purpose—even when mingled with exempt purposes—voids exempt status).
57. See Peña & Reid, supra note 54, at 1872-74.
58. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2011).
59. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 526,
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (2010).
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business. Any proceeds from the sale of those goods simply offset the
additional cost to the business. Ultimately, the charitable goal is
unrecognized, and therefore the social business fails to engage in a
charitable activity in its operation with respect to that transaction. 60
Conversely, the nonprofit would be able to benefit financially from the
entire transaction being tax-free and completely related to its charitable
purpose. This is an odd result, because in both corporate situations the
results are charitable and only the effect upon the tax situation of the
companies is altered.
The irony in this is that in this hypothetical a social business, as
compared to a nonprofit, has the potential to do far greater “good” in
total pecuniary benefit to the producer.61 This is because, while a
nonprofit has to depend on donors, members, grants, and other forms of
support, the social business is purely market-based. If the social business
thrives, then the producers gain tremendously through direct revenue. An
effective social business can create social benefits that rival the salaries
(and bonuses) of top executives on an annual basis. The fact that the
operational test would fail means that the social business would struggle
to convert into an exempt.

3.

Lack of True Ownership and Control

Another problem with converting a social business into a taxexempt organization is that an exempt is not “owned” by anyone.62
Board members may feel like they own the exempt organization, but as a
matter of law they do not. There are generally no shares of stock in a
nonprofit.63 Also, there is a requirement that no individual benefits from

60. See Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991). In that case, an
exempt sold groceries which were essential to their religious practice. The sale of
groceries was substantially related to the religious purpose, but the business also had a
profit motive. However, the appellate court was unable to grapple with the ostensibly
commercial nature of the business. I would argue that the Living Faith grocery store is an
example of a social business that was unrecognized in the revenue code.
61. The Concept of L3C, AMS. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcom
munitydevelopment.org/concept.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
62. See 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW & TAXATION § 1:1 (West 2011);
Nonprofit Organization, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legalguide/nonprofit-organization (last updated Feb. 3, 2009).
63. Nonprofit Organization, supra note 62. Some states do allow shares of stock in
nonprofits. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1602 (West 2012).
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any transaction.64 The lack of an equity-based return is a serious
detriment to the nonprofit business model. Some nonprofit directors
choose not to receive compensation.65 As a result, key corporate actors
are generally not provided with any reward.66 This provides a strong
disincentive to innovate beyond the reasonable compensation that is
allowed.67 This can dissuade many social business entrepreneurs who are
interested in being well compensated for their charitable efforts or who
compete with businesses in which their own financial status can
determine the relative likelihood of their success.
An exempt organization cannot exist beyond the scope of its
mandate.68 Specifically, once the money supply is gone the nonprofit
ceases to exist. Once the individuals who maintained the exempt are
deceased, there is nothing tangible to exist into perpetuity.69 While board
members may have agreed upon rights to succession, and perhaps even
wrote a procedure for dissolving the exempt, the fact that there is no
personal ownership is profound. The federal tax regulations mandate that
assets cannot be transferred among the board or members, which speaks
to the fact that the directors of a nonprofit do not generally exert
“personal control” over matters.70 The lack of a personal stake in the
outcomes of the organization ideally means that individual interests are
truly altruistic, regardless of the reality of this ideal. Such severe
restrictions upon exempt organizations make it an unsuitable model for
social businesses, which are ostensibly retail in character.
64. See Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 62. Again, while some states may
permit stock ownership; most nonprofits are deemed non-stock corporations. 1 FLETCHER
CYC. CORP. § 68.05 (West 2012).
65. See BROADSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Implications
for Nonprofit Organizations, BOARDSOURCE (2003) http://www.boardsource.org/dl.asp?d
ocument_id=558.
66. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (West 2011); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2002).
Intangible rewards are hard to quantify. If the principal director of a nonprofit gets public
accolades for her work, is she in violation of the private inurement doctrine?
67. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
68. See Internal Revenue Manual—7.25.2 Single Parent Title Holding
Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025002.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).
69. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 12.03 (2008) (indicating that assets dedicated
to a charitable purpose cannot be diverted to serve another purpose).
70. See Martin J. Trupiano, Nonprofit Directors: IRS Raises the Governance Bar,
LAW OFFICES MARTIN J. TRUPIANO, (2008), http://www.mtrupianolaw.com/uploads/IRS_
Raises_the_Governance_Bar.pdf. IRS Form 990 is an example of how the IRS has sought
to make the role of directors more transparent.
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The lack of an ownership stake in an exempt demands that the
exempt have an inflexible business model. Ownership provides personal
financial involvement and interest in obtaining a return on investment.
This is especially true because if the goals of the social business change,
it becomes difficult to alter the nature of the corporation to pursue new
activities. This is perhaps why some social businesses have decided to
not risk pursuing legitimacy as an exempt from the federal government.71
The possibility of losing the flexibility that is inherent to business
organizations in the United States is scary and sufficient to ward off
potential do-gooders.
The traditional exempt organization, devoid of any for-profit
entanglements, would not struggle with many of these issues because its
origin developed organically and not through the product of contrivance
for exempt status. However, the converted social business may run into
trouble if it is closely held and has an expectation to produce a certain
amount of stable income for a small group of investors over the long
term. These investors may have their whole lives staked in the business.
If the exempt organization no longer has committed members, then dayto-day operations of the social business could suffer. If corporate
activities proceed downhill, dissolution or bankruptcy can become a
reality. In fact, some state statutes prevent certain relationships among
directors of a nonprofit.72
An exempt organization’s assets cannot be sold and used for a nonexempt purpose without incurring major tax liability as an excess benefit
transaction.73 Because of this prohibitive rule, the social business
nonprofit is compelled to use proceeds for charitable purposes.74 This is
extremely difficult because the law is unsettled in how this might occur.
Valuing a social business can end up posing a multi-million dollar loss
for the initial group of investors who may have risked a substantial
portion of their own money during the social business’ inception and
would like to see some financial reward for their initial outlay.75

71. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Resier, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2437 (2009) (recounting Google’s pursuit of for-profit philanthropy).
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (West 2011).
73. I.R.C. § 4958(b) (West 2011) (referring to a 200 percent tax on excess benefit
transactions that are uncorrected).
74. See id.
75. Because of the excess benefit tax, families cannot reasonably pass on a
nonprofit. See id.
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Restrictions on Corporate Activity

One major problem with converting a for-profit business into a
nonprofit is the limitations on the types of activities an exempt business
may perform. Charitable organizations must stick closely to the work
defined in their charitable purpose stated in their articles of
incorporation. Nonprofits that engage in activities that do not seem to
relate to their charitable purpose are taxed on these so-called unrelated
business transactions.76 If they become excessive, the nonprofit exempt
status can be jeopardized.77
This limitation is different from the standard applied in corporate
law under traditional ultra vires activities because nonprofit exempts are
subject to restrictive tax rules, which compel the organization to act only
with respect to furthering the activities which benefit the charitable
cause. Otherwise, they risk loss of its nonprofit status.78 The rationale
behind the tax-based restriction on nonprofit activity is to ultimately
ensure that the taxpayers as a whole are subsidizing only charitable work
and not largely unrelated business. While all corporations must follow
their articles of incorporation, exempts have more duties and restrictions
imposed by the federal tax laws.79 The restriction on corporate activity
makes the exempt more susceptible to dramatic loss of revenue for their
operations because they are limited in how they can innovate.
Exempt corporate activity is largely governed by the prohibition
against self-dealing.80 To some extent, self-dealing has benefitted the forprofit market, and perhaps shareholders tangentially.81 As for-profits,
social businesses could also benefit from limited self-dealing.82 This is

76. § 513.
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008); CELIA ROADY, UBIT
PROBLEMS FOR TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/A353BFFF-AA44-4FF3-AAE3C25E55A48AC3_Pu
blication.pdf.
78. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218,
237 (2003). The duty of obedience probably has a stronger tie to the ultra vires doctrine
of corporate law.
79. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 1191.
80. See, e.g., Estate of Reis v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1016 (1986).
81. The fact that jurisdictions often do not ban self-dealing is indicative of potential
efficiencies contained within such transactions. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of
Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 401-5
(2003).
82. See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-1 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(b)-1 (as
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because self-dealing involves benefit to the individuals of the
company—otherwise known as “disqualified persons.”83
These people are also key stakeholders in the future and growth of
the company and are oftentimes visionaries. In a stock-ownership
context, if transparency exists, investors are likely to obtain a portion of
the benefit from their investment relationship to a successful firm. This is
not the case for exempts because of the lack of shareholders to “benefit”
financially and the per se assumption that self-dealing violates the nondistribution rule as well as the exclusive charitable purpose
requirement.84 The lack of ownership and transparency of a nonprofit
makes the exempt model more susceptible to malicious self-dealing.
Self-dealing is generally considered a problem in business law, but
the reality is that a board of directors of an exempt caught self-dealing
will be financially injured in the long term. A social business may simply
be able to walk away from the problem by removing the director and
undoing the unfair transaction. Perhaps they would have to pay
shareholders directly or through court order. However, an exempt would
be attacked by the state as well as the federal government. This is
because state attorney generals’ have the power to regulate exempts.85 If
the exempt fails, then the goodwill of the company ceases to exist and is
erased in an onslaught of negative media attention.

5.

Inability to Deduct Monetized Social Benefits

With no exempt status, our hypothetical social business is in a
quagmire—potentially losing tax-deductible expenditures because it has
no possibility of a tax deduction at all. It can donate a substantial sum of
money to some other exempt “qualified organization” but it cannot do so
within the exact meaning of its own goals as a social business. If the goal
of the social business is to sell products at a substantial profit and then to
return a vast percentage of those profits to the producers, it would fall
afoul of the nonprofit rules.
amended in 1986); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(c)-1 (as amended in 2009); Treas. Reg. §
53.4941(d)-1 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1 (amended in 1986); Treas. Reg. §
53.4941(f)-1 (amended in 2009).
83. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (2002).
84. The nature of self-dealing is conferring a private benefit and this violates the
principle that any profit in an exempt be directed to an exempt purpose.
85. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 610 (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2011).
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In other words, a social business is punished for its explicit profit
motive which underlies the overarching goal of maximizing social
welfare. One goal of working with an exempt is that a social business
would be able to deduct the charitable portion of its work.86 While the
IRC specifies a charitable deduction limit for corporations, at least some
percentage of a social business’ charitable work would be recognized in
the form of a tax break. It is from this core benefit that the notion of
managing an exempt in conjunction is born and discussed herein.

6.

Tax Liabilities Increase

What remains, however, are the tax implications of running a social
business as an exempt. On paper, reorganization is possible and, while
difficult, may be worthwhile for some social businesses. Perhaps the
initial group of investors could eschew any personal and financial reward
they may obtain from the sale of the business after they are gone, but
there are issues with increased tax liability. The increase in liability is
comparable to a social business merely donating a percentage of its
profits to a nonprofit.
One major point of concern for social businesses is the prohibition
on conducting activities that would produce ongoing income obtained
from trade or business activities that are not substantially related to the
charitable goal.87 For example, if corporations raise money through
regularly performed fundraising events that involve the sale of goods not
related to benefitting the stated class of individuals, then income from
that activity is ultimately reduced by the UBIT liability.88 Federal tax law
conceptualizes these activities as, among other things, not being
motivated for charity because they compete with for-profits engaging in
the same business.89 This problem should be analyzed in depth whenever
conceptualizing the work of an exempt organization.
Significant UBIT (also known as Unrelated Business Taxable
Income, or UBTI) may even pose a threat to the exempt status of a
nonprofit social business.90 This would occur when the UBTI begins to
86. I.R.C. § 183 (West 2011).
87. §§ 511-512.
88. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 598, TAX ON
UNRELATED BUSINESS OR INCOME OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3, 8 (2010).
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319 (1950) (indicating that unfair competition was key
in passing the unrelated business taxable income rules).
90. § 501(c)(3) (indicating that a nonprofit charitable organization must be

15

JAGANNATH_Formatted_Finalv2

254

PACE LAW REVIEW

4/11/2012 7:39 PM

[Vol. 32:1

become a “substantial” portion of the total income.91 Merely producing
income from the sale of goods would not jeopardize tax-exempt status,
so long as the activities do not become “substantial.”92 What
“substantial” means in monetary terms is still a mystery; however the
IRS has determined that “substantial lobbying” probably means more
than 20 percent of the exempt purpose expenditures.93 While this value is
not on-point for the analysis of what constitutes “substantial” for the
hypothetical exempt organization, it provides a yardstick of what the IRS
perhaps believes to be significant. In other words, it is prudent for an
exempt to not permit UBTI to exceed a quarter of annual revenue
generated.

IV. Operating a Nonprofit in Parallel with a Social Business
Why would social businesses want to simultaneously run an exempt
charity? First, the tax rules for social businesses are the same as for any
other for-profit corporation and therefore there are no special tax benefits
for maximizing social benefit as opposed to profit. This has already
created a disincentive to “do good.” It poses a problem for competition
because businesses are often engaged in the same activities in which
exempt charities are engaged.94 The disparity may create a financial
incentive to subject a corporation to additional regulations as an exempt,
absent the retail work of the business.
Scholars argue that the exempt entity is not as efficient as a forprofit simply for the reason that the profit motive does not have a welldefined incarnation in a nonprofit.95 At least one problem with nonprofits
is that they are expected to profit for their cause but cannot engage in
profit motives. That makes the nonprofit exempt inherently
uncompetitive in a market filled with for-profits. The inefficiency of
lacking a profit motive means that it would not be wise to eliminate the
for-profit, but at the same time managers want public support and
positive media attention that exempt organizations often receive.
“exclusively” operated for its charitable purpose).
91. Id. See also Living Faith Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008).
93. § 4911(c)(2) (specifically for organizations operating with a revenue of less
than five million dollars).
94. See Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field of Tilting a
Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007).
95. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 1192.
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More to the point, many social businesses could not run themselves
as exempts because of their low profit margins.96 While profit is
theoretically on the agenda, social business profit tends to be essentially
ancillary to the social goal and therefore social businesses are profiting
by a shoestring.97 By running a parallel exempt corporation, a social
business can begin to take advantage of its role by utilizing tax benefits
the law recognizes. It will alleviate some accounting issues as well. It is
not uncommon for for-profit business leaders to sit on multiple boards,
including those of nonprofits.98 Having multiple opportunities to connect
with wealthy donors and other like-minded corporations can be
beneficial.
Managing an exempt, if done effectively, should allow a social forprofit business to take tax deductions for the monetary portion of its
giving per year, if the giving can be monetized.99 This would allow for
both a tax deduction as well as a lowering of its tax base, the limit being
10 percent of the annual taxable income.100 Contributions for
corporations can carry over for five consecutive tax years.101 This is
wonderful for a social business, because while it will be unable to deduct
the total contributions per year, it can develop a carryover balance, which
will persist for a statutory period of fifteen years.102 The deduction
reserve balance will presumably be helpful for the business during less
profitable years.

1. Benefits of a Nonprofit at a Glance
Exempt organizations can be a lot of work to incorporate and
operate. However, an exempt organization should do more for the social
business than simply accepting profits. The exempt’s goals should work

96. Exempts are often funded heavily on contributions such as grants which social
businesses cannot woo. See § 170(c)(2).
97. YUNUS, supra note 15, at 114.
98. See Making Nonprofit Partnerships Effective, BOARDSOURCE, http://www.board
source.org/Spotlight.asp?ID=116.375 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011); see also GRANT
THORNTON, NOT-FOR-PROFIT BOARDMEMBER HANDBOOK 31 (2011), available at
http://www.grantthorton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Not-for-profit%20organizations/Board%
20member%20handbooks/NFP%20booklet%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
99. See generally § 162.
100. § 170(b)(2)(A).
101. § 170(d)(2)(A).
102. Id.
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in tandem with the social business. It would provide a positive public
relations outlet for the for-profit and could be able to solicit donations
and contributions stemming from its 501(c)(3) status.103 It would be able
to raise capital for charitable purposes through funding from private
grants and provide an outlet for interested parties and investors to serve
as leaders of the nonprofit board.104 Many public charities seek out
powerful socialites or recognized figures to serve on the board of
directors in order to make connections and obtain charitable gifts.
Charities often make inroads with politicians and lobbyists, seeking to
alter the law within the constraints of 501(c)(3).
The exempt would also be able to benefit from passive investments
without incurring UBIT, which can in turn be used to further the goals of
the exempt and the for-profit.105 The exempt organization can seek out
volunteers to assist in the activities in which the social business would
have engaged.106 This leads to the final controversial point: the exempt
organization may be able to increase the profitability of the social
business by supplanting some of the “social” roles that it otherwise
engages in.

2. Methods of Utilizing or Implementing a Nonprofit
There are at least two principal ways of pairing a nonprofit with a
social business. One model would be to have an exempt nonprofit own
and operate the social business entity. I call this the “nonprofit parent
model.” Another method would be to have the for-profit manage an
exempt organization. This I note as the “social business mutual benefit
model.” Both methods accomplish many of the same financial desires,
but they have different corporate and tax ramifications. Each method is
better suited to the unique needs of a social business. Because a nonstock nonprofit corporation has no true owners, the social business

103. For-profits are also free to solicit donations, but the likelihood of individuals
making such a donation is minimal.
104. Many grants are solely awarded to 501(c)(3) public charities. See generally
Advanced Search, GRANTS.GOV, http://www.grants.gov/search/advanced.do;jsessionid=b
WGLTmpSjQtvpN2TDJ2bW4cHsscQz3GLxNVBMt2nJQJnmsvHJLpS!-1373114776
(last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (allowing searches for current and archived federal grants
that are available to 501(c)(3) charities (some of which are restricted solely to 501(c)(3)
charities)).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1 (1992).
106. § 513(a)(1).
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directors instead would carefully select individuals who would be loyal
to both the social business and the nonprofit goals, to ensure that the
organizational charitable purpose of the exempt is essentially identical to
that of the social business. Although exempt organizations tend to have
distinct names, the corporate name of the social business could even be
shared pursuant to fictitious name rules.107

3. Nonprofit Parent Model
The nonprofit parent model would have been an ideal model before
the 1950s. This is because Congress passed the UBIT tax rules for
exempt organizations only after that time. This scenario would have the
social business sending all the profits over to the exempt organization
and thereby totally avoiding tax liability on the charitable contributions
under the destination of income test.108 The social business would
therefore be a “feeder” corporation for the nonprofit exempt. This model
was perfect and social enterprises in foreign jurisdictions that permit
such a corporate relationship should utilize this method.
Today, this set-up is highly restrictive for the social business
because UBIT would be assessed against the nonprofit for its ownership
stake in the for-profit business.109 For example, if the social business ran
a macaroni factory, the sale of that good probably does not advance the
charitable purpose of the exempt parent.110 Indeed, if all the nonprofit did
was simply accept money from the feeder and pour it into a charitable
cause, its nonprofit status could be in jeopardy.111 This is unfortunate
because the social business should be free to do what it pleases, within
the confines of legal corporate action, to product profits for the nonprofit
parent.
There is a not-so clever way to circumvent this problem, but it could
require significant administrative burden. This would require that the
social business sell goods and services which advance the charitable
107. 6 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2442 (West 2011).
108. §§ 512-514. See also United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105
(1986).
109. UBIT would be assessed assuming that some unrelated business is conducted.
110. This is a famous reference in nonprofit law. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r,
190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951).
111. § 501 (permitting such conduct would violate the “exclusive” purpose clause
of the statute which bore the “operational test”). See also Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-1 (as
amended in 2008).
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purpose of the nonprofit parent—that is, it substantially advances the
goals directly as opposed to simply via financial backing. For example, a
nonprofit dedicated to elevating the economic status of certain
craftspeople could legitimately own a social business whose sole purpose
is to sell the products produced by the very same artisans.112
Then there is the clever method to circumvent the problem. The
following suggestion is viable only for larger social businesses with the
wherewithal to manage a complex business. The nonprofit would have to
set up some sort of intermediate corporation in order to avoid triggering
excessive UBIT liability or revocation of exempt status. This “blocker”
corporation would perhaps be a limited liability company (LLC) whose
sole purpose is to “shield” the nonprofit from UBIT. It is imaginable that
many nonprofits are not going to appreciate having to set up something
like this. The LLC would also have to be set up as a corporation rather
than a partnership to avoid pass-through taxation.113 This is possible
under state law where the incorporator can elect a taxation preference.114
This intermediary corporation would be able to solve some other
problems as well, and should carry on some other legitimate business
purpose. This business purpose would be hard to define in the abstract,
but at least its presence would not require a new payroll.

4. Maximizing the Blocker LLC
The blocker LLC’s ability to benefit the organization depends on
the size of the social business. The exempt organization should utilize the
LLC to engage in substantial investments. The LLC intermediary would
not escape standard corporate tax rates on whatever activities it engages
in.115 The rule on passive income is that it will not trigger UBIT for the
nonprofit exempt if it is not commercial in nature.116 While active
112. See Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
113. There is a presumption that state LLC statutes organize members as a
partnership for tax purposes. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Limited Liability Company Acts—Issues Relating to Formation of Limited
Liability Company and Addition or Disassociation of Members Thereto, 43 A.L.R.6th
611 (2008).
114. See Limited Liability Company, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD,
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/bus_structures/LLcompany.shtml (last visited Nov. 25,
2011).
115. Limited Liability Companies are treated as corporations when they elect to be
taxed independently. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 1 (2011).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(a)(1) (1992).
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management of investments may constitute UBIT, shifting the
investment task to another company would be permissible without
jeopardizing exempt status.117
Nonprofits cannot themselves engage in so-called “debt-financed”
or leveraged investments.118 However, the nonprofit can circumvent the
prohibition against margin trading by using the LLC to engage in
derivatives or securities investment.119 This would leverage cash coming
in from the for-profit and presumably significantly increase it.120 The
goal of debt-financed investments has been deemed by courts to be a
profit motive.121 Therefore, this intermediary accomplishes debt-financed
investing without having to subject the exempt parent to UBTI
liability.122 Because the LLC is a separate legal entity, it does not affect
the exempt status of the parent.
Depending on the financial circumstances, the exempt organization
may prefer to simply partake in passive investments on its own without
bothering with the intermediary. A nonprofit exempt is permitted to
invest its capital in securities which would be otherwise taxed for a social
business.123 This theoretically results in a net gain for social businesses,
which allows them to contribute more money to charities.

5. The Problems with the Nonprofit Parent Model
Ultimately, the nonprofit parent model is a bit too unwieldy to be
applied to small and medium-sized social businesses. This rests largely
on the fact that a nonprofit which owns a social business cannot gain

117. MORGAN LEWIS, ACCOMMODATING TAX-EXEMPT INVESTORS: UNDERSTANDING
UBTI 3 (2012), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/documents/VCPEFdeskbook/
VCPEFdeskbook_AccommodatingTaxExemptInvestors.pdf.
118. See Bartels Trust ex rel. Univ. of New Haven v. United States, 209 F.3d 147
(2d Cir. 2000).
119. See id.
120. While the S&P 500 index has performed poorly in the past decade, during
positive times gains are significant. See Floyd Norris, A Historical Cycle Bodes Ill for the
Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 2012, at B3.
121. See Bartels Trust, 209 F.3d at 155.
122. I.R.C. § 514 (West 2011). See also Bartels Trust, 209 F.3d at 155 (explaining
that debt-financed investments trigger UBTI).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f) (as amended in 2011). In many instances, at least
33.33 percent of an exempt’s revenue must arise from public support, through direct or
indirect contributions from the general public, known as the “public support test.” See §
1.170A-9(f)(1)(ii).
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anything through tax planning if its desires are to utilize the social
business for unrelated business activity. It would take a lot of careful
planning and management of the social business to ensure its activities
serve the social outcomes of the exempt.
The nonprofit parent does not solve the problem of principal
investors not being able to own the social business. This is because the
social business must continue to be operated by the exempt.124 As a
result, the nonprofit parent model is still plagued with problems that
affect any transition from social business to a nonprofit exempt. For each
corporate intermediary that gets added on, taxes are due, and UBIT
issues could persist without respite.
A minor problem exists regarding who controls the for-profit and
the propriety of this control. It will not seem prudent if the directors of
the nonprofit spend a considerable amount of time managing the forprofit as opposed to managing the affairs of the nonprofit. While there is
nothing to necessarily prevent a nonprofit from possessing a social
business, many questions would be raised if the principal human actors
in each organization were the same. In the extreme case, the social
business could be thought of as a mere instrumentality of the
nonprofit.125 A nonprofit that possesses a social business and is
financially successful is not necessarily committing fraud.126 Although
six-figure salaries are common for nonprofit directors, a court will not be
reluctant to find foul play if salary increases as a result social business
presence can be found.127
Finally, in some states there is a minimum franchise tax which is a
practical disincentive to create corporate intermediaries.128 Consider that
nonprofits are often poorly funded, survive on thin budgets, and do not
have the extra personnel to allocate to red tape. If the social business is
not producing enough revenue to warrant substantial investments for
124. If the social business is wholly owned and operated by the exempt, the exempt
cannot simply sell its equity stake in the company without incurring taxes. It is treated as
non-divertible property.
125. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 266 (D. Del. 1989).
126. It is worth noting that a nonprofit is not barred from making a profit at all. See
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 3.01-3.02 (2008); 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 64, at § 1:1.
127. See CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 2010 CEO COMPENSATION STUDY 1 (2010),
available at http://www.charitynavigator.org/__asset__/studies/2010_CEO_Compensatio
n_Study_Revised_Final.pdf
128. See, e.g., What Is the Minimum Franchise Tax?, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD,
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/faq/712.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7

22

JAGANNATH_Formatted_Finalv2

4/11/2012 7:39 PM

2012] USING NONPROFITS TO SERVE CHARITABLE GOALS

261

these intermediary corporate entities, then the nonprofit parent model is
simply a bureaucratic nightmare which is not outweighed by its benefits.
Many nonprofit exempts can avoid paying franchise tax.129

6. Social Business Mutual Benefit Model
The premise of the social business mutual benefit model is to
convert social business made profits into federally recognized tax
deductions by sending them over to a related exempt organization whose
charitable goal is substantially the same as the social business. This
model benefits the for-profit social business by utilizing the corporate
charitable contribution tax deduction and the social business could
deduct business expenses incurred by the nonprofit. It is also a more
flexible model because it permits the social business to conduct a wide
range of business activities which would have otherwise been considered
unrelated in the nonprofit parent model.
In the social business mutual benefit model, the social business has
control over the exempt.130 This requires that members of the exempt
organization’s board be carefully selected and vetted by the shareholders
of the social business. Rather than the social business “giving away” the
money to the supplier, either directly (as could happen for profit and loss
rationales) or via increased purchase prices, a legally recognized
nonprofit entity accepts the contribution.131 Here, taxpayers actually see a
net benefit to governmental coffers to boot because, although the money
is not taxed at the exempt end, the social business continues to pay taxes
at the corporate taxation rate, less any deductions it is able to write-off.
There is no UBTI complication.
One advantage of this model is that it does not require the use of
intermediary corporations. While extensive use of intermediary
corporations can help solve business (usually tax) problems, they are not
considered “ethical” in the eyes of some nonprofit directors and
donors.132 These organizations may conflate what are commonplace in
129. 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 64, at § 2:27.
130. HOPKINS, supra note 47, at 59.
131. I.R.C. § 170(h) (West 2011). It is important to note that one cannot deduct
money given away to an individual. See § 170(c). For example, a donation to a homeless
beggar, regardless of how destitute, is not contemplated as a charitable deduction under
the plain language of the prevailing deductions provision. Id.
132. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, I.R.S. Offers a Tougher Amnesty Deal for
Offshore Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at B3; Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Takes on
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the for-profit arena with greedy practices that they may associate only
with business executives, regardless of legality of the practice.

7. Benefits for the Social Business from the Presence of a
Nonprofit
Overall, the presence of an exempt nonprofit can tremendously
benefit a social business’ charitable goal. However, other benefits are not
immediately conspicuous. These include the ability to obtain grant
funding for the charitable cause, name recognition, public support and
recognition, and, controversially, enhanced profits for the social business
itself. Public recognition is not something that would be possible simply
among the for-profit sector for most social businesses.
When a new exempt becomes successful, philanthropic circles focus
their attention. After all, philanthropy is not totally altruistic—donors
want to know their money is being used to a positive end. This leads to
public media attention and increased competitiveness of the charitable
goal. The intangible benefit of recognition is something that cannot be
replicated with tax incentives. This is largely because the relationships
that are formed by the presence of an exempt can provide a selfsufficient monetary backbone for an exempt and may prop up the social
business as well.
The presence of an exempt can also ensure that operations that are
exempt and non-exempt are kept separate. It cannot be undervalued that
the social business mutual benefit model is an excellent choice for
smaller operations because separate entities would force managers to
keep separate books. The separation makes tracking and earmarking
funds a simpler task for the organizations. Having separation also means
dividing projects based on what organization would be better suited.
Social businesses are better suited for retail than exempts, and therefore
the clear separation of entities would further this end.

8. Inurement or Private Benefit?
Private benefit and inurement pose interesting problems for the
social business parent model. Exempts cannot confer a private benefit

Tax Abuse by Charity Support Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at B1. Usually what
makes this worse is incorporating intermediaries in other countries.
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upon any single person or organization.133 This rule is quite old and
relates back to the exclusive charitable purpose of an exempt and the
rationales for providing tax exemption as a special benefit to the
organization.134 Thus, if the nonprofit exempt is acting in a way that
makes the social business more profitable, it is arguably conferring an
impermissible private benefit upon the owners of the social business.
While that does create a certain level of liability if the organization gets
attention, the positive end is that it increases productivity of the for-profit
without the need of any additional capital—human or financial. It can be
said to relieve the burden incumbent upon the social business to carry out
the benefits it seeks as well. The exempt would be managing the “social”
end of the social business.
There are two arguments that directors could use to avoid this
problem. First, a substantial amount of directors should not sit on the
boards of both the nonprofit exempt and the social business.135 It may be
permissible for one or more individuals to be shared, depending on the
size of the board. Having a board with more shared directors than the
minimum number required would be preferable.136 This action would
mitigate any private inurement issues. Second, it is important to show
that any excess benefit is not accruing to the individual owners of the
social business but to the hypothetical producers.137 Having a good
portion of the board be unrelated by blood or marriage would also
mitigate the notion that a benefit was being conferred upon
individuals.138
Finally, the mere presence of another company cannot reasonably
be said to automatically create a private benefit because it may be argued
that any nonprofit exempt may confer a private benefit on some forprofit company or individual unrelated to that company. For example, if
certain lending companies benefitted from the transactions of a nonprofit,
would this be a private benefit? It seems that private benefit is quite an
133. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987);
Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
134. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 1950)
(indicating existence before 1950); Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, sec. 32, 28 Stat. 509,
556-57 (1894); Treas. Reg. § 1.503(b)-1 (1976).
135. See P.L.L. Scholarship Fund v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 196, 200 (1984).
136. Compare MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.03(a) (2008) (requiring at least
three directors), with DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b) (West 2011) (mandating a
minimum of one director).
137. See KJ'S Fund Raisers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 669 (T.C. 1997)
138. Id.
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extensive doctrine and hard to predict.139 Although the benefit doctrine is
very much alive and well, it has yet to be applied in the novel context
described above.140
The IRS has been very active in stripping exempt status from
organizations that violate the private benefit rule, and can do so because
of the strict rule that a single non-exempt purpose, even insubstantial,
can defeat exempt status for an organization.141 This rule originates from
the notion that Congress confers a tax exemption to an organization as a
privilege, not a right, and that any interpretation of applicable law will
most likely be strictly construed, or at least given plain meaning.142 This
is not to say that pursuing a federal tax exemption in the United States is
impossible for a social business, but, depending on how large the social
business ends up, the tax commissioner may begin to investigate the
nature of the exempt and its business conduct.

V. Ramifications for Development
The foregoing discussion has been practical in nature. I hope it is
beneficial to those considering the social business model for their own
entrepreneurial endeavors. However, the implications of the social
business model should enhance both an exempt’s charitable output as
well as a social business’ profit and consequent charitable output. This
combination theoretically presents a phenomenal outcome for selfinterested actors who still want to “do good,” but not at the expense of
their quality of life.
If anyone can claim to have implemented social development on a
large scale, it is ironically the private sector. There has been discourse
about such development in legal academia for decades.143 The United
States has not only been reluctant to adopt the right to development
recognized by the United Nations—it has not allocated resources to the
139. See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1072-73 (1989)
(indicating that the disproportional training of Republican candidates would confer a
private benefit).
140. HOPKINS, supra note 47, at 59.
141. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201008050 (Feb. 26, 2010); HOPKINS, supra note 47,
at 52.
142. See Better Bus. Bureau of D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1945).
143. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the
Right to Development, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3 (1988); Stephen Marks, The Human
Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137 (2004).
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effort.144 Government apathy has not stymied the private sector’s drive
for innovation. The social business model is apt for the private sector
because it allocates rewards for efficient and superior management, while
simultaneously recognizing the virtues of charitable giving on a much
larger scale. The motto of social business gels well with the modern
consumer conscience.
An example of increased charitable output arises from the
hypothetical symbiosis of the social business and the nonprofit exempt.
The practical relationship between these two entities is governed by the
transfer of cash between the social business and the exempt. From this
transfer the profitability increases for the social business because the
exempt benefits from an increase in capital for its charitable cause. The
producers who are benefitting from the presence of the exempt improve
their lives and, presumably, the output is used by the social business to
turn a profit. Thus, the cycle can repeat itself, and an extremely
sustainable model for development flourishes.

VI. Conclusion
While the tax code does not yet embrace social businesses as a
charitable business model, it does not prevent creative implementation of
a nonprofit exempt. While social businesses could theoretically convert
themselves into nonprofits under state law, most will not generally
qualify as federal tax exempts due to the harsh requirements. The current
tax code does not make conversion a viable option for social businesses.
Not only is it not lucrative to convert into a nonprofit exempt, it is also
harmful for the social cause because exempt status brings with it severe
restrictions that do not comport with retail commercial models.
The solution is a two-part, symbiotic organization. It seems logical
for small social businesses to manage an exempt company. This exempt
company, owned by no one, would be dedicated to carrying out the goals
of the social business. This exempt organization would act in ways that
further the goals of the social business through contributions from the
social business and other sources. The reverse is also a viable option for
larger nonprofits that can afford to manage a wholly owned and operated
social business. This structure may raise suspicion from regulators, but,
if carefully operated, the business purpose of the social business could be
tailored to avoid any excessive tax liability for the nonprofit.
144. See Marks, supra note 143, at 152-53.
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Finally, the social business model could accelerate the rate of global
economic development while also aligning the financial incentives for
developers. In a future with significant investment in social business, the
shift can move away from microfinance and lending to larger-scale social
enterprise. While there is a bright future for the social business model,
there is no need to wait for the current legal regime to provide the correct
incentives.
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